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Maastricht University
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University of Groningen
We argue that team information acquisition mediates the effect of the relationship of
team locus-of-control composition and leadership structure on team financial perfor-
mance in a decision-making context. Hypotheses were tested on 44 teams participating
in an elaborate and lengthy international management simulation. As predicted, teams
with high average internal locus-of-control scores performed better without leaders
and with low locus-of-control heterogeneity. The opposite was found for teams with
high average external locus-of-control scores. Contrary to expectations, teams with
high locus-of-control heterogeneity did not benefit more from having leaders than
teams with low heterogeneity. Information acquisition mediated relationships between
locus-of-control composition and performance.
Pfeffer’s (1983) and Hambrick and Mason’s
(1984) independent pleas to study organizational
and top management team demography have trig-
gered a substantial body of empirical research into
the effects of team composition variables on team
and organizational outcomes. Generally, early re-
search studied simple “main effects” of the means
and the spread of variables measuring demographic
characteristics on outcome variables such as turn-
over, innovation, diversification, and performance.
From these efforts, researchers have learned that
team composition does indeed make a difference.
However, as is now generally acknowledged, the
relationship between team composition and out-
comes is much more complex than was originally
thought (Lawrence, 1997; Priem, Lyon, & Dess,
1999; Williams & OReilly, 1998). Recent empirical
investigations therefore have developed more com-
plex theoretical and empirical team composition
models in a number of ways. For instance, scholars
now distinguish between different kinds of team
diversity, such as deep-level versus overt demo-
graphic diversity (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Jehn
& Mannix, 2001; Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999;
Pelled, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).
Furthermore, researchers are now analyzing me-
diating mechanisms that underlie observed rela-
tionships, and they have begun to include moder-
ator variables such as time (Harrison et al., 1998),
task complexity and interdependence (Jehn et al.,
1999), task routineness and group longevity (Pelled
et al., 1999), and interpersonal congruence (Polzer,
Milton, & Swann , 2002). In the present study we
follow the lead of these researchers by developing
hypotheses that go beyond simple main effects, by
taking into account basic contingency and mediat-
ing variables. We take leadership structure as a
moderator, responding to the plea of several re-
searchers to incorporate team structure variables,
such as power distribution and role interdependen-
cies, in team composition research (Finkelstein,
1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Mintzberg,
1979). We focus on a specific deep-level character-
istic of team members, the locus-of-control person-
ality trait (Rotter, 1966), and test a mediating model
relating team locus-of-control composition to team
financial performance through information acqui-
sition behavior.
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Apart from focusing on complex and subtle in-
teraction effects, our study makes two additional
contributions to the team composition literature.
First, our study is one of the first to focus on per-
sonality as a composition variable. In their compre-
hensive review of top management team research,
Priem and colleagues (1999) saw the tendency to
sacrifice construct validity for reliable measure-
ment as a major flaw of previous studies. That is, a
few notable exceptions aside (e.g., Barrick, Stewart,
Neubert, & Mount, 1998), the emphasis has almost
exclusively been on assessing the demographic
characteristics of team members, not so much for
substantive reasons but rather because of their
availability and measurability. This is the case both
in top management team research (Hambrick,
Geletkanycz, & Frederickson, 1993) and in the
broader social psychological field of intragroup
functioning and effectiveness (Barrick et al., 1998).
A focus on more fundamental behavioral tenden-
cies rooted in personality is warranted because
these are more directly linked to behavior and pro-
vide a more valid measurement of values and atti-
tudes than do demographic variables (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984).
Second, the focus on more “substantive” dimen-
sions of individual differences such as locus of
control offers the opportunity to study other impor-
tant dependent variables outside the current do-
main of mainstream team composition research. As
there is ample experimental and field evidence that
individuals with an internal locus of control gather
more information in the course of decision making
and are better at information processing than those
with an external locus of control (Lefcourt, 1982),
we chose to explain the information acquisition
behavior of different teams as a function of their
locus-of-control composition. Another reason to fo-
cus on information acquisition behavior is that in-
depth field research on top management teams sug-
gests that information plays a central role in
decision-making effectiveness. This is because
such teams are bombarded with information (Ham-
brick, 1995), making information-processing capac-
ity of vital importance. Notwithstanding the prob-
lems of information overload, an analysis by
Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois (1997) of top
management teams in technology-based companies
suggests that “more information is better,” because
building decisions on facts focuses team member
attention on issues instead of personalities. Be-
cause differences in the capacity to gather and
handle information are potentially important de-
terminants of decision-making teams’ effective-
ness, we analyze whether information acquisi-
tion behavior mediates the relationship between
team locus-of-control composition and team fi-
nancial performance.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESES
Locus of control is an important and well-docu-
mented personality trait that refers to individual
differences in a generalized belief in internal versus
external control of reinforcement (in the context of
a stimulus and response [Rotter, 1966]). People
with an internal locus of control (“internals”) see
themselves as active agents. They feel that they are
masters of their fates, and they trust in their capac-
ity to influence the environment. Conversely, those
with an external locus of control (“externals”) see
themselves as relatively passive agents, believing
that the events in their lives are due to uncontrol-
lable forces. We chose to study this particular trait
because it indicates fundamental differences be-
tween individuals (Boone & De Brabander, 1993).
Furthermore, control perceptions appear to be very
salient in explaining effective management. Specif-
ically, research into the relationship between CEO
locus of control and organizational performance
consistently shows that firms led by CEOs who are
internals perform better than firms headed by those
who are externals, both in the short and the long
run (Boone, De Brabander & Hellemans, 2000;
Boone, De Brabander, & Van Witteloostuijn, 1996;
Miller & Toulouse, 1986). In the present study, we
hypothesize on the effects of both the mean and
dispersion of this characteristic in teams on infor-
mation acquisition behavior, which we consider to
be a mediating variable in explaining team perfor-
mance differences. On a general level, we hypoth-
esize that (1) the impact of the team locus-of-con-
trol mean depends on the within-group locus-of-
control diversity, and (2) the effects of both the
team locus-of-control mean and its standard devi-
ation are contingent on the leadership structure of a
group. Figure 1 shows the model that is tested here.
The derivation of specific hypotheses is described
below.
The Impact of Mean Team Internality
Locus of control is strongly associated with indi-
viduals’ feelings of potency. People with an exter-
nal locus of control (externals, or external individ-
uals) tend to feel like pawns in a complicated
environment governed by forces outside their own
control, whereas internals feel they are active mas-
ters of their own fates. Experimental and field stud-
ies have indeed shown, time and again, that inter-
nals are much more likely and more motivated than
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externals to use all their faculties to understand
and influence their surroundings, as doing so
heightens the probability of successfully regulating
behavior (for a reviews, see Boone et al. [1996] and
Lefcourt [1982]). Not surprisingly, research has
demonstrated that internals generally perform bet-
ter than externals not only in experimental tasks,
but also in many achievement-related domains,
such as career track and education (Andrisani &
Nestel, 1976; Lefcourt, 1982; O’Brian, 1984).
Interesting for the purpose of the present study is
that locus of control has been related in numerous
experiments with cognitive activities like attention
and alertness, and information search and assimi-
lation. Specifically, in reviewing the findings on
cognitive capacities of internals versus externals,
Phares concluded that internals “acquire more in-
formation, make more attempts at acquiring it, are
better at retaining it, are less satisfied with the
amount of information they possess, are better at
utilizing information and devising rules to process
it and generally pay more attention to relevant cues
in the situation” (1976: 78). All this provides sup-
port for the validity of the locus-of-control con-
struct as it is indicative of a basic striving of inter-
nals to actively engage in seeking relevant cues in
their environments to determine and make sense
out of their positions and to guide or adapt their
behavior accordingly. Personality research, in ad-
dition, makes it clear that individuals with an in-
ternal locus of control have larger information-pro-
cessing capacities than their counterparts with an
external locus of control (Govindarajan, 1988,
1989), and they therefore will gather more informa-
tion and utilize it better in decision making.
One can easily extrapolate this finding to the
team level of analysis. A team consisting predomi-
nantly of internals is more likely to develop a col-
lective team-level sense of potency. Such a team,
compared to a team consisting of externals, will
believe that the group can effectively influence
team processes and outcomes, such as the quality
of decisions. The feeling of collective potency will
stimulate such internal teams to collect more infor-
mation in an attempt to increase team effectiveness.
The higher information-processing capacity of
teams predominantly consisting of internals will
reinforce such intent and efforts. Interestingly,
Shea and Guzzo found that team potency—a col-
lective belief of a team’s members that the team can
be effective—is one of the most important group-
level factors that determine “real-world, real-time
group effectiveness”(1987: 26). Our reasoning sug-
gests that team potency does not only depend on
external contingencies (see Guzzo & Shea, 1987),
such as the resources and time a team has to per-
form a task, but also on the locus-of-control person-
ality traits of its individual members.
To summarize, we expect that internal teams,
because of their sense of potency and higher infor-
mation-processing capacity, will gather more infor-
mation in a decision-making context. Having infor-
mation is very important for effective decision
making in complex, competitive environments as it
helps a team to develop a more complete under-
standing of choices and to create a richer range of
options from which to choose (Eisenhardt et al.,
1997). As more information is better in such con-
texts (Eisenhardt et al., 1997: 79), we also expect
internal teams to be more effective; in the study
reported here, we expected they would achieve
higher financial performance in a simulation game.
In other words, information acquisition behavior is
expected to mediate the relationship between team
internality and performance.
A researcher might test this hypothesis by esti-
mating the main effect of a team’s locus-of-control
mean. In doing so, one implicitly assumes that the
so-called additive aggregation model is applicable
(Chan, 1998), whereby the higher-level construct is
just a summation of the lower-level units, regard-
less of the variance among these units. However,
this model is inappropriate here because our team-
level hypothesis is based on individual-level per-
sonality theory. In such a case, effects of mean
composition can only be expected when dispersion
is low (Chan, 1998). To put it differently, “If the
team is highly fragmented, the team’s overall, aver-
age characteristics will have little predictive value”
(Hambrick, 1995: 125). As a result, a fair test re-
quires homogeneity (i.e., low dispersion) of the per-
sonality traits of team members. Taken together,
these arguments lead to the following set of medi-
ation hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Mean team internality and
team information acquisition have a positive
relationship when team locus-of-control dis-
persion is low.
Hypothesis 1b. Mean team internality and
team financial performance have a positive re-
lationship when team locus-of-control disper-
sion is low.
Hypothesis 1c. Team information acquisition
mediates the relationship explicated in Hy-
pothesis 1b.
The Impact of Team Leadership
We expect that the impact of the mean and the
dispersion of the locus-of-control scores on team
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behavior will depend on the team’s leadership
structure. Surprisingly enough, the moderating ef-
fect of team structure variables such as power dis-
tribution and role interdependencies are rarely
studied (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). In the area
of top management team studies, for instance,
Finkelstein (1992) noted that the failure to take into
account power differences between executives
might yield potentially misleading research find-
ings. Obviously, the more decisional power is cen-
tralized in the hands of one or a few influential
team members, the less it makes sense to expect
important effects of team composition variables
(Hambrick, 1995). Mintzberg (1979) has already ar-
gued that it is too simple to assume that the impact
of each member on team outcomes is equal. This
assumption is, however, implicitly made when
main effects of team composition measures are
assessed.
In the present study, we focused on a simple
leadership moderator: the presence of a team
leader. It is clear that the decision-making process
will be quite different in teams with leaders and in
teams consisting of equals only. For one, decision
making in a team with a leader will be more cen-
tralized, implying a larger impact of the preferences
of the leader as far as the content of decisions is
concerned. In addition, in teams with a leader the
flow of information between the members of the
team will be more structured, and dominated by
vertical channels running from the member to the
leader and vice versa. Because leaders tend to
structure the flow of information in a team, having
a leader is likely to increase the “vertical” informa-
tion-processing capacity of the team (Galbraith,
1973). In decentralized teams, without a leader,
information flows are less structured, with horizon-
tal channels connecting every member dyad of the
team (Leavitt, 1951; Mackenzie, 1978). As we will
explain below, the structuring, integrating, and co-
ordinating role of leaders might affect the quality of
decision-making outcomes and team effectiveness,
depending on the composition of a team.
The benefits of leaders in teams of externals.
We expect that an external team (one with a high
mean externality score) will especially benefit from
having a leader. Given that externals lack a feeling
of potency, teams primarily consisting of such in-
dividuals will also be less likely to develop a sense
of collective potency, which is paramount for team
effectiveness (Shea & Guzzo, 1987). Having a leader
can compensate for this lack of group potency.
Indeed, according to Shea and Guzzo, prototypical
high-performance teams have supervisors that
“guide, direct, and, above all, monitor their group
in light of task interdependence, outcome interde-
pendence, and potency” (1987: 28; emphasis
added). This guidance is exactly what externals
need, as previous research has shown that these
individuals actually prefer to work in a structured
environment with clear leadership (Abel-Halim,
1981; Mitchell, Smyser, & Weed, 1975; Runyon,
1973; Spector, 1982). Conversely, internals are bet-
ter performers and show higher motivation in par-
ticipation-demanding environments (Brownell,
1981,1982), prefer positions in which they are able
to influence their task environment (Karabenick &
Addy, 1979), and prefer working in decentralized
settings (Spector, 1982). This line of research
clearly suggests that the leadership structure
should fit a subordinate’s locus of control, and that
leadership seems to work especially when people
need guidance (i.e., lack a feeling of potency).
Thus, we expect that having a leader will increase
the performance of teams consisting primarily of
externals, but not that of teams dominated by inter-
nals. We also expect that differences in the extent
of team information acquisition will at least partly
explain why especially external and not internal
teams will benefit (in terms of team effectiveness)
from having leaders. Specifically, external teams
will gather less information either because they do
not collectively believe they can be effective as a
team or because they have a lower team capacity to
adequately deal with information. Adding a leader,
and thus a “vertical information system,” to an
external team increases its feeling of potency and
probably compensates for insufficient information-
processing capacity. The increased potency that a
leader brings to an external team will add to the
salience of information as a way to “act out” po-
tency and improve performance. As a result, the
team’s information acquisition prior to decision
making will rise. Conversely, internal teams do not
need such a vertical information-processing sys-
tem, as their information-processing capacity is in-
herently high and their collective potency moti-
vates team information acquisition without the
stimulating and structuring presence of a leader.
Hence, we expect that having a leader in an internal
team will not increase its information acquisition
behavior. Because of the importance of information
with respect to the quality of decisions in complex
decision-making contexts, these arguments lead to
the following second set of mediation hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. Leader presence and team in-
formation acquisition have a positive relation-
ship when mean team externality is high.
Hypothesis 2b. Leader presence and team fi-
nancial performance have a positive relation-
ship when mean team externality is high.
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Hypothesis 2c. Team information acquisition
mediates the relationship explicated in Hy-
pothesis 2b.
Hypotheses 2a–2c posit an interaction effect of
mean team locus of control and the presence of a
team leader on information acquisition and finan-
cial performance. We recognize, given Hypotheses
1a–1c, that this interaction might also depend on
the locus-of-control dispersion in a team, which
implies a complicated three-way interaction. For
the sake of parsimony, we focus in our theory sec-
tion on two-way interactions only, but we tested for
the presence of three-way interactions empirically.
This is also the case for all subsequent hypotheses.
The benefits of leaders in teams lacking inte-
gration. In his detailed field study on top manage-
ment teams, Hambrick (1995) observed that team
fragmentation is a major but virtually unexplored
problem that, according to CEOs, undermines the
effective functioning of their teams. Fragmented
teams do not engage in mutual and collective inter-
action and are not behaviorally integrated. As a
result, such teams have inferior prospects for
prompt, adaptive decision making, particularly
where coordination is required, because they have
great difficulty spotting and agreeing on important
challenges and formulating and implementing re-
sponses to such challenges (Hambrick, 1995). Frag-
mentation can be the result of many centrifugal
forces, such as the size, scope, and strategy of a firm
(Hambrick, 1995). However, the mere microlevel
composition of teams in terms of the diversity of
member characteristics is also an important factor
that might result in team fragmentation. Specifi-
cally, in traditional social-psychological theory,
heterogeneity among team members is assumed to
hamper cognitive and behavioral integration, and
ultimately team effectiveness (Shaw, 1981; Wagner,
Pfeffer, & O’Reilly, 1984). Recent team composition
research, however, shows that this assertion does
not hold true for task-related types of team diver-
sity, such as heterogeneity with respect to the func-
tional background of team members (Hendriks,
2004; Jehn et al. 1999; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin,
1999). Such diversity triggers task-related conflict,
which enhances sound decision making and team
effectiveness (Eisenhardt et al., 1997). However,
diversity related to deep differences, such as values
and attitudes, appears to be very problematic for
effective team functioning, since it triggers emo-
tional conflicts and associated communication
problems and role conflicts (Harrison et al., 1998;
Jehn et al., 1999). As locus of control is a deep
characteristic, we expect that similar problems of
team fragmentation and lack of behavioral integra-
tion will occur in teams with high locus-of-control
diversity.
Indeed, the attitudes and behaviors of internals
and externals have been shown to be fundamen-
tally different. Internals are proactive, oriented to-
ward action, and inclined to take risks, while ex-
ternals are more reactive, passive, and risk averse
(Boone, De Brabander, & van Witteloostuijn, 1996;
Lefcourt, 1982). Given these attitudinal differences,
it is very likely that externals and internals will
analyze, interpret, and act upon the same decision
situation in different ways. CEOs with a high inter-
nal locus of control, for instance, are more inclined
to pursue innovative and risky strategies than their
counterparts with an external locus of control
(Miller, Kets de Vries, & Toulouse, 1982), even
when they operate in the same market environment
(Boone et al., 1996). In a Prisoner’s Dilemma con-
text, externals are less inclined to play coopera-
tively than internals (Boone, De Brabander, & van
Witteloostuijn, 1999), and they learn payoff-maxi-
mizing behavior more slowly (Boone, De Bra-
bander, Carree, de Jong, van Olffen, & van Wittel-
oostuijn, 2002). These fundamental differences
between internals and externals are likely to cause
communication barriers and hamper team integra-
tion when internals and externals have to work
together. Such deep fragmentation might lead to
harmful rivalry in which disagreement on specific
decision issues expands to matters of style and
personality (Hambrick, 1995). In other words, per-
sonalities might become intertwined with issues so
that constructive conflicts degenerate into dysfunc-
tional interpersonal conflicts.
What is differentiated has to be integrated for
effective performance. This principle applies not
only to organizations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967),
but also to teams (Hambrick, 1995; Priem et al.,
1999). Both Eisenhardt and her coauthors (1997)
and Hambrick (1995) suggested that team leaders
(e.g., CEOs) are extremely important to overcome
team fragmentation and to help teams focus on
issues and not on personalities. Eisenhardt et al.
(1997) argued that although top management teams
need a balanced power structure, they at the same
time need a relatively powerful CEO to avoid dis-
ruptive interpersonal team conflicts. The point is
that a leader may facilitate a focus on issues (e.g.,
by inserting facts in team discussions), help to
frame decisions, and create common goals. In a
similar vein, Hambrick (1995) pointed to the im-
portant role of CEO leader behavior in molding
“real” instead of fragmented teams. This is of
course all the more important when the likelihood
of fragmentation and interpersonal conflict in-
creases owing to deep-level (i.e., locus-of-control)
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diversity. This hypothesis was recently confirmed
in a field study of 38 firms by Hendriks (2004), who
demonstrated that centralization of decision mak-
ing in the hands of the CEOs was positively related
to financial organizational performance for top
management teams with high locus-of-control dis-
persion. In the present study, we therefore ex-
pected that having a leader would not only be ben-
eficial for external teams (cf. Hypotheses 2a and
2b), but also for teams with high locus-of-control
dispersion. Thus,
Hypothesis 3. Leader presence and team finan-
cial performance have a positive relationship
when team locus-of-control dispersion is high.
As the potential mediating role of information ac-
quisition is highly speculative here, we refrain
from proposing a formal hypothesis (hence the
question mark in Figure 1). To be sure, deep-level
diversity is expected to increase need for informa-
tion, as objective information represents an impor-
tant way to achieve cognitive, emotional, and be-
havioral integration in a team (Eisenhardt et al.,
1997). However, an increased need for information
when locus-of-control dispersion is high does not
necessarily imply that such teams will indeed
gather more information. In addition, it is possible
that the high need for information associated with
team locus-of-control diversity is actually lower for
teams that have leaders. Specifically, because a
leader serves as a team integration device, she or he
might operate as a substitute for extensive informa-
tion gathering to achieve integration in fragmented
teams. Teams with high locus-of-control dispersion
and leaders might then actually end up with less
information than teams with no leaders, which in
turn may hamper decision-making effectiveness.
Team leader personality. In discussing the po-
tential benefits of leadership above, as a first step,
we only distinguished teams as with and without
leaders. However, it is likely that the impact of
leaders will depend on their personalities, as well
as on their skills and talents. Given that research
clearly shows that internals are more astute leaders
than externals, in general (Boone et al., 1996;
Boone, De Brabander, & Hellemans, 2000), and that
their information-processing capacity is more de-
veloped (Lefcourt, 1982), we expect that teams with
leaders will benefit more when those leaders are
people with high internal loci of control (with high
internality). Hence,
Hypothesis 4. Leader internality and team fi-
nancial performance have a positive relation-
ship when mean team externality is high (Hy-
pothesis 2b) and when team locus-of-control
dispersion is high (Hypothesis 3).
METHODS
Setting, Procedures, and Data Collection
The data for this study were drawn from a large-
scale Dutch multiperiod management simulation
called the International Management Competition
(IMC). The IMC was launched in 1973 as an in-
company training device. Since then, it has been
commercialized by a professional game company,
continuously developed, and is now played annu-
ally, with registration open to teams from any or-
ganization inside and outside the Netherlands. Or-
ganizations generally enroll teams of (young)
managers for training purposes, often as part of
their own management development programs. In
the 1994 IMC, where we collected our data, 167
teams/companies involving a total of about 700
people actively played the game. Participation
costs approximately €2,900 (in 1994 prices) per
team (in addition to time consumption), a fee typ-
ically paid by team members’ employers. Partici-
pants are offered a one-day closing seminar, and
the winning team wins a business trip to Japan.
Thus, teams have rather strong incentives to play
seriously. Past evaluations and personal observa-
tions indicate well-motivated participants working
closely together in playing the game. The fact that
only 7 percent of all teams dropped out during the
1994 game corroborates these impressions.
At the heart of the simulation lies an elaborate
industry model, containing about 1,400 parame-
ters, which is based on standard economic theory
(for details, see van Olffen [1999]). This model
makes the game a very sophisticated and realistic
simulation of a multifaceted business environment.
In the game, small teams run fictitious multiprod-
uct production firms. These teams have to decide
on a broad range of business issues, including in-
vestments in personnel and machine capacity, raw
material purchases, wage levels, efficiency im-
provements, promotion outlays, product price lev-
els, dividend payments, borrowings, redemptions,
customer credit terms, working climate outlays,
quality and efficiency R&D expenditures, and
much more. Moreover, careful matching of all these
elements over time is needed to perform well. Com-
bined, these features make the task of playing the
game a challenging one. It is therefore crucial that
teams stay abreast of important developments in
their environment in order to plan and adjust their
actions. In fact, we were assured beforehand by
IMC management that it is virtually impossible to
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be successful in the game without gathering proper
information. Teams can buy information on a range
of issues. It is this category of team decisions that is
of focal interest in the current study.
Not all 167 teams compete with each other. In-
stead, at the start of the game, the game’s manage-
ment forms random groups of 5 teams each. Each
group is the game equivalent of an industry with
five competitors. All teams in all industries have
exactly the same material and financial starting
position, facing identical, fixed game parameter
settings. There are no relationships between the
industries whatsoever. Teams are well supported
during the game: in order to minimize misunder-
standings, they receive an extensive game manual
and have access to a “helpdesk” in Amsterdam.
The game’s objective is to maximize current and
future profitability, as well as market shares. Six
“decision periods” occur, each lasting two weeks.
Decisions are entered on a preformatted form con-
sisting of 37 options. Twenty-three of these pertain
to major decision categories like investments in
machines, personnel, raw materials, promotion,
R&D, and marketing and production targets. The
remainder of the decision form concerns 14 spe-
cific information requests on, for instance, the ef-
fects of promotion outlays, R&D spending, pro-
jected market demand, and competitors’ prices. At
the end of each two-week period, teams have to fax
their decision forms to the game’s management in
Amsterdam, specifying their decisions for the up-
coming period. After processing all teams’ deci-
sions, game management provides each teamwith a
printed summary of its results for the current pe-
riod. This feedback includes much free detailed
information, including market shares, profit rates,
and financial and stock positions. Important for our
purposes is that each results summary also con-
tains specific information a team has requested, for
which it has to pay a fixed per-unit fee. Game
management provided us with all the decisions of
all teams, including the specific information they
requested in each period.
Data collection was logistically challenging. Each
team was enrolled under the name of a single con-
tact person. This means that game management
could only provide us with the mail addresses and
telephone numbers of these people, after which we
had to chart the teams surrounding each person
ourselves. We did so by sending six copies of our
first questionnaire to the contact person, requesting
him or her to distribute them among the other team
members, collect them, and send them back to us in
a supplied envelope. On each questionnaire, we
asked participants to state their initials and the size
of their team. Upon receipt of questionnaires, we
could—by counting and comparing—reconstruct
the size of each team and the identity of the mem-
bers. The contact people, who were very coopera-
tive, cleared up most remaining uncertainties.
We sent out two questionnaires to collect per-
sonal and group structure data. As stated, each was
mailed to all team contacts who agreed to distribute
them among team members. Contact people were
reminded twice by phone to have all members re-
spond. The first questionnaire contained questions
relating to the members’ backgrounds in terms of
age, education, tenure, former work experience,
and team member familiarity. It also included a
validated psychological test, measuring locus of
control. Three months after the start of the game,
team members were asked to individually fill out a
second questionnaire regarding group processes,
such as decision rules, emergent leadership, and
extent of participation on the team. To be able to
reliably use the group process data from the second
questionnaire, we screened teams for individual
nonresponse and dropped 14 entire teams in which
fewer than 2 members returned the second ques-
tionnaire. From the remaining teams, we removed
21 members who did not participate in the ongoing
simulation, according to at least 2 fellow team
members. After two reminders, we thus ended up
with a final reliable sample of 44 teams (26 % of
167), consisting of 193 individuals. A total of 178 of
these people (i.e., 92%) returned the second ques-
tionnaire. Almost all participants in our sample
were Dutch (93%), the remainder coming from
such diverse countries as Belgium, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and Switzerland. The
sample included only a small minority of women
(13%), and about 58 percent held university de-
grees. The average age was about 34, and age ranged
from 21 to 55, with modest variation. The typical
participant was a young Dutch male executive with
some (about 6 years) in-company business experi-
ence. People had known their fellow teammembers
for about 2 years on average, and only one-fifth had
ever participated in a management game of this
kind before. Teams had an average of 4.39 members
(s.d. 1.02; range 2–7). Note that only one group
in the sample consisted of 2 members. We also
performed our analyses excluding this group and
found the results to be very similar to the ones
reported below. A leader was present in 25 teams
(57%).
We performed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to
check whether the 44 teams in our sample differed
in important ways from the 123 unselected teams.
We found no significant difference (p  .10) be-
tween the groups on their average return on invest-
ment, profit, total monetary value of information
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outlays, and total number of information items
bought. The absence of significant differences be-
tween participating and nonparticipating teams on
our major dependent variables made us confident
that sampling bias was not a major concern and that
our sample was broadly representative.
Dependent and Mediating Variables
Teams could buy information on 14 issues in
each period by marking these items on the decision
form. Task information concerned the impacts of
actions, such as the consequences of product R&D
for product quality or of process R&D for efficiency,
and the “ceteris paribus effect” of advertising ex-
penditures on their market share. These effects
were fixed in the game’s parameters, time invari-
ant, and equal—but initially unknown—for all
firms. Competitive information was knowledge of,
for instance, competitors’ prices, stocks, product
quality, and forecasts of demand. Our major medi-
ating variable was simply the number of different
information items bought in each period. In the last
decision period (period 6), buying information was
futile, as there was no upcoming period. We there-
fore only analyzed the number of information items
bought in periods 1 through 5, obtaining 220 obser-
vations (5 periods  44 teams). We decided to
analyze the number of information items bought
instead of the teams’ monetary outlays for informa-
tion because the latter distribution was highly
skewed, posing serious estimation problems owing
to outliers. Note, however, that the monetary value
of information bought by the teams correlates al-
most perfectly with the number of information
items (r  .97, n  220). Results for both measures
are almost identical (available upon request). Fi-
nally, team financial performance was captured
with a standard measure of profitability, return on
equity (ROE), defined as profit after tax divided by
balance sheet equity (see also Boone, van Olffen, &
van Witteloostuijn, 1998).
Independent Variables
Individual locus-of-control perceptions were
measured with a Dutch translation of the well-
known and widely used Rotter scale (Rotter, 1966).
It contains 37 forced-choice items, 23 of which
measure control expectancies and 14 of which are
filler items. Respondents have to choose between
an internal and an external control alternative. The
total Rotter score is obtained by summing the num-
ber of external control alternatives chosen (with a
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 23). The reliabil-
ity and validity of this Dutch translation have been
repeatedly demonstrated (Boone & De Brabander,
1993). Non-Dutch teams received a version that
was translated into English and checked by native
speakers. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in our sam-
ple was .68, which concurs with internal consisten-
cies reported by Rotter (1966) and Robinson and
Shaver (1973). This alpha value is very close to .70,
which is the lower bound often recommended for
research tools (Nunnally, 1978). Two team compo-
sition variables were used: the team-level mean and
the team-level standard deviation of the Rotter
scores, respectively labeled average external locus
of control and locus of control heterogeneity. To
facilitate the interpretation of the coefficient esti-
mates, the team average was centered around the
sample’s mean (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2003).
In order to identify whether or not team leader-
ship was present, we asked all team members
whether one member, perhaps unintentionally or
informally, led team decisions about how to play
the game. If a respondent answered yes, we asked
the initials of that team member. From these iden-
tifications, we calculated for each individual the
following ratio: the number of times he or she was
identified as leader by another team member di-
vided by the maximum possible number of identi-
fications by others (equals team size minus 1).
Team members who scored at least 50 percent on
this measure were identified as leaders. This pro-
cedure yielded unique leaders in 25 teams. This
identification was further validated by the fact that
fellow team members rated leaders significantly
higher than nonleaders on their (relative) influence
on decisions (1, “no influence,” to 5, “a lot of in-
fluence”). The average individual influence score
was 3.38 (s.d.  0.64, n  168) for nonleaders and
4.13 (s.d.  0.48, n  25) for leaders (t  5.65, p 
.001, n  191). Leaders also scored significantly
higher on internal locus of control than nonleaders.
The average Rotter scores were 8.08 (s.d.  2.06,
n  25) and 9.71 (s.d.  3.65, n  168) for leaders
and nonleaders, respectively (t  3.26, p  .01, n 
191), levels consistent with earlier research show-
ing that emergent leaders in groups tend to be more
internal than nonleaders (Anderson & Schneier,
1978).
Control Variables
We controlled for possible financial constraints
on buying information by including a team’s avail-
able amount of cash in each period. Mean age, age
heterogeneity (i.e., the standard deviation), the pro-
portion of male members, and team size were in-
cluded as standard demographic controls. Gender
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heterogeneity was not included because of the
small number of women in the sample and its ex-
tremely high correlation (r.92, n 44) with the
teams’ mean gender (proportion). We used game
period dummies to control for between-period vari-
ation in the dependent variables. As decision-mak-
ing quality could be related to team differences in
prior knowledge, experience, and motivation, we
inserted the following proxies in our models to
control for these potential alternative explanations:
(1) a dummy indicating whether or not a team was
voluntarily composed (coded 1 if 75 percent or
more of the members indicated the team was so
composed, and 0 otherwise), (2) the average num-
ber of years that team members had been ac-
quainted, (3) the average number of hours worked
together as a team in each decision period, (4) the
proportion of team members with experience play-
ing similar games, and (5) the proportion of team
members with university degrees. Table 1 reports
the descriptive statistics of and the correlations
among the variables.
Estimation Procedure
The structure of the data is a pooled cross-section
and time series (n  220; 44 teams  5 periods).
Pooled data generally exhibit autocorrelation as the
same entities are observed several times. The fixed-
effect estimator, which is widely used to account
for this problem, could not be applied because our
main independent variables did not change over
time. Following Baron, Hannan, and Burton (2001),
we used Liang and Zeger’s (1986) method of gener-
alized estimating equations (GEE), which general-
izes quasi-likelihood estimation to the panel data
context and is a very flexible way to deal with
clustered data (for applied introductions of GEE,
see Ballinger [2004; an organization science appli-
cation] and Zorn [2001; political science]). GEE
allows one to take into account different autocorre-
lation structures by specifying a working correla-
tion matrix. We assumed first-order autocorrela-
tion. We also estimated models with other
autocorrelation structures (not shown here). The
results of these models were almost exactly the
same. Because the observations within the teams
could not be assumed to be independent, we also
report robust standard errors, using the sandwich
estimators developed by Huber (1967) and White
(1982).
An important benefit of GEE is that it can easily
be applied to dependent variables with different
kinds of distributions. In the present case, we noted
that our mediating variable, number of information
items bought, was not normally distributed. Inspec-
tion of the frequencies showed that this count vari-
able followed a Poisson distribution with overdis-
persion (i.e., the variance was larger than the
mean). A common solution to this problem is to
estimate a negative binomial model. A drawback of
GEE, however, is that the residuals from these mod-
els are correlated, making the development of sum-
mary goodness-of-fit statistics for GEE models
problematic (Ballinger, 2004; Zorn, 2001). Instead,
we used (and report) Wald chi-square statistics,
which test the null hypothesis that all regression
coefficients are equal to zero. As Ballinger (2004:
146) warned, this statistic is not a goodness-of-fit
measure, and is, therefore, not suited to comparing
the goodness of fit of alternative models. All mod-
els were estimated using the XTGEE routine of ver-
sion 7.0 of STATA.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the regression estimates of our
independent variables on information acquisition
and ROE. To assess the extent to which information
acquisition acted as a mediator, we followed Baron
and Kenny’s (1986: 1176) approach (see also James
& Brett, 1984). Specifically, information acquisition
would be shown to function as a mediator when it
met the following conditions: (1) variations in the
team-composition-related independent variables
significantly accounted for variations in informa-
tion acquisition (path a in Figure 1), (2) variations
in information acquisition significantly accounted
for variations in ROE (path b), and (3) the signifi-
cant relationship between our team-composition-
related independent variables and ROE (i.e., the
total effect) was no longer significant when infor-
mation acquisition was controlled for; that is, the
direct effect was not significantly different from
zero (path c). Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 investigate
path a. Models 3 and 4 estimate the total effect of
our team composition interactions, and model 5
focuses on the total effect of information acquisi-
tion (the mediator) on ROE (path b). Finally, Model
6 shows the direct effect of all focal independent
and mediating variables (path c). The models in
Table 2 only show estimates of all two-way inter-
actions of average external locus of control, locus-
of-control heterogeneity, and presence of a leader.
For the sake of completeness, we also estimated
models including the three-way interaction of
those three variables. As none of these estimates
turned out to be significant, we do not report them
(they are available upon request).
Models 1 and 3 reveal that none of the main
effects of the locus-of-control mean and standard
deviations are significant. If we had stopped here,
898 OctoberAcademy of Management Journal
T
A
B
L
E
1
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
an
d
C
or
re
la
ti
on
s
am
on
g
th
e
T
ea
m
-L
ev
el
V
ar
ia
bl
es
a
V
ar
ia
bl
es
M
ea
n
s.
d
.
M
in
im
u
m
M
ax
im
u
m
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1.
C
as
h
ba
la
n
ce
at
be
gi
n
n
in
g
of
p
er
io
d
1,
14
5.
53
2,
66
7.
83

4,
07
6.
40
12
,0
04
.4
0
2.
T
ea
m
si
ze
4.
39
1.
02
2.
00
7.
00

.2
6†
3.
T
ea
m
vo
lu
n
ta
ri
ly
co
m
p
os
ed
0.
80
0.
41
0.
00
1.
00

.0
7
.0
3
4.
A
ve
ra
ge
n
u
m
be
r
of
ye
ar
s
ac
qu
ai
n
te
d
2.
02
1.
63
0.
28
7.
33

.0
9

.1
9
.1
5
5.
N
u
m
be
r
of
h
ou
rs
w
or
ke
d
as
a
te
am
3.
13
1.
54
0.
92
8.
50
.1
8

.2
1

.1
7

.1
8
6.
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
m
em
be
rs
w
it
h
ga
m
e
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
0.
22
0.
26
0.
00
1.
00

.0
8
.1
1

.1
3
.2
2
.1
3
7.
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
m
em
be
rs
w
it
h
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
d
eg
re
es
0.
60
0.
35
0.
00
1.
00

.0
1

.2
1

.1
7

.1
3
.0
4

.0
8
8.
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
m
al
e
m
em
be
rs
0.
86
0.
18
0.
33
1.
00

.2
1
.2
4
.0
2
.0
5

.0
6

.1
6

.1
8
9.
A
ve
ra
ge
ag
e
34
.1
3
5.
95
22
.8
0
50
.6
7
.0
5

.1
1
.0
4
.5
8*
*

.1
1

.0
8

.0
4
.3
1*
10
.
A
ge
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
4.
44
2.
31
0.
58
9.
56
.1
9
.0
6

.0
2
.0
2
.0
6

.2
0

.1
4
.1
2
.5
3*
*
11
.
A
ve
ra
ge
ex
te
rn
al
lo
cu
s
of
co
n
tr
ol
9.
43
1.
59
5.
50
12
.2
5
.0
7
.1
6

.0
4

.1
4

.0
6
.0
5

.1
4

.0
1

.1
5

.0
9
12
.
L
oc
u
s-
of
-c
on
tr
ol
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
3.
34
1.
23
0.
00
6.
08

.3
7*
.3
4*

.1
4

.1
6

.1
5

.0
6
.1
7
.3
1*

.0
6

.0
5
.3
2*
13
.
P
re
se
n
ce
of
a
le
ad
er
b
0.
57
0.
50
0.
00
1.
00
.1
0
.0
6

.1
0

.1
1
.0
4
.2
2
.2
8†
.0
7
.0
1

.0
6
.0
8
.1
3
14
.
N
u
m
be
r
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
it
em
s
ac
qu
ir
ed
5.
00
2.
93
0.
60
11
.8
.0
2
.1
9

.0
2

.2
1
.0
7
.2
4

.1
0
.1
8

.1
2

.0
5
.0
5
.0
3
.2
1
15
.
R
et
u
rn
on
eq
u
it
y
1.
08
1.
68

2.
53
6.
51

.1
0
.2
2
.0
2

.1
7

.0
4
.0
2
.0
5
.2
9†

.2
0

.2
5
.1
3
.1
1
.0
6
.4
4*
*
a
V
ar
ia
bl
es
th
at
va
ri
ed
p
er
p
er
io
d
w
er
e
av
er
ag
ed
at
th
e
te
am
le
ve
l
so
th
at
n
eq
u
al
s
44
th
ro
u
gh
ou
t.
b
C
od
ed
0/
1.
†
p

.1
0
*p

.0
5
**
p

.0
1
T
w
o-
si
d
ed
te
st
s.
T
A
B
L
E
2
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
A
cq
u
is
it
io
n
an
d
R
et
u
rn
on
E
qu
it
y
(H
yp
ot
h
es
es
1–
3)
a
,
b
,
c
V
ar
ia
bl
es
M
od
el
1:
N
u
m
be
r
of
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
It
em
s t
M
od
el
2:
N
u
m
be
r
of
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
It
em
s t
M
od
el
3:
R
O
E
t
1
M
od
el
4:
R
O
E
t
1
M
od
el
5:
R
O
E
t
1
M
od
el
6:
R
O
E
t
1
C
on
st
an
t
0.
89
(0
.9
8)
0.
51
(0
.9
6)
3.
04
(2
.6
9)
2.
97
(2
.4
4)
2.
80
(2
.6
8)
2.
89
(2
.6
0)
P
er
io
d
2

0.
38
**
(0
.0
9)

0.
42
**
(0
.0
9)

5.
11
**
(0
.7
5)

5.
11
**
(0
.7
5)

5.
58
**
(0
.7
7)

5.
38
**
(0
.7
8)
P
er
io
d
3

0.
31
**
(0
.0
9)

0.
38
**
(0
.1
0)

1.
50
*
(0
.7
3)

1.
51
*
(0
.7
3)

1.
65
*
(0
.7
2)

1.
59
*
(0
.7
3)
P
er
io
d
4

0.
39
**
(0
.0
9)

0.
45
**
(0
.0
9)

0.
83
(0
.7
1)

0.
84
(0
.7
1)

0.
97
(0
.7
0)

0.
91
(0
.7
0)
P
er
io
d
5

0.
57
**
(0
.1
1)

0.
63
**
(0
.1
2)

0.
25
(0
.5
8)

0.
25
(0
.5
8)

0.
26
(0
.5
6)

0.
26
(0
.5
7)
C
as
h
ba
la
n
ce
at
be
gi
n
n
in
g
of
p
er
io
d
5.
5
E
-5
**
(6
.0
E
-6
)
5.
4
E
-5
**
(6
.5
E
-6
)

0.
00
01
**
(2
.7
E
-5
)

0.
00
01
**
(2
.8
E
-5
)

0.
00
01
**
(2
.7
E
-5
)

0.
00
01
**
(2
.8
E
-5
)
T
ea
m
si
ze
0.
07
(0
.1
0)
0.
20
**
(0
.0
8)
0.
30
(0
.3
7)
0.
49
(0
.3
2)
0.
27
(0
.3
6)
0.
43
(0
.3
2)
T
ea
m
vo
lu
n
ta
ri
ly
co
m
p
os
ed
0.
01
(0
.2
1)

0.
23
(0
.1
9)

0.
33
(0
.6
8)

1.
01
(0
.6
6)

0.
40
(0
.6
8)

0.
89
(0
.6
7)
A
ve
ra
ge
n
u
m
be
r
of
ye
ar
s
ac
qu
ai
n
te
d

0.
10
(0
.0
8)
0.
04
(0
.0
7)

0.
12
(0
.3
1)

0.
21
(0
.3
0)
0.
00
2
(0
.2
9)
0.
21
(0
.2
9)
N
u
m
be
r
of
h
ou
rs
w
or
ke
d
as
a
te
am
p
er
p
er
io
d
0.
00
2
(0
.0
5)

0.
07
(0
.0
4)

0.
02
(0
.1
8)

0.
23
(0
.1
9)

0.
02
(0
.1
6)

0.
18
(0
.1
9)
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
m
em
be
rs
w
it
h
ga
m
e
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
0.
45
(0
.3
6)
0.
63
(0
.3
0)

0.
60
(1
.2
1)
0.
27
(1
.1
4)

1.
31
(1
.1
2)

0.
37
(1
.2
6)
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
m
em
be
rs
w
it
h
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
d
eg
re
es

0.
29
(0
.3
1)
0.
06
(0
.2
6)

0.
34
(1
.2
0)
0.
46
(1
.2
2)

0.
15
(1
.1
2)
0.
39
(1
.1
9)
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
m
al
e
m
em
be
rs
0.
86
(0
.5
5)
0.
30
(0
.5
7)
2.
65
(1
.9
9)
1.
97
(2
.1
4)
1.
97
(1
.9
4)
1.
67
(2
.1
5)
A
ve
ra
ge
ag
e
0.
00
1
(0
.0
2)

0.
04
(0
.0
3)

0.
00
3
(0
.1
0)

0.
09
(0
.1
0)

0.
00
9
(0
.0
9)

0.
07
(0
.1
0)
A
ge
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty

0.
02
(0
.0
5)
0.
06
(0
.0
5)

0.
32
*
(0
.1
9)

0.
15
(0
.1
7)

0.
30
*
(0
.1
8)

0.
18
(0
.1
8)
A
ve
ra
ge
ex
te
rn
al
lo
cu
s
of
co
n
tr
ol
d

0.
01
(0
.0
7)

0.
61
**
(0
.1
6)
0.
16
(0
.2
2)

1.
30
*
(0
.6
0)
0.
16
(0
.2
1)

0.
99
(0
.6
5)
L
oc
u
s-
of
-c
on
tr
ol
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
0.
02
(0
.0
8)
0.
34
**
(0
.1
1)

0.
19
(0
.3
5)
0.
43
(0
.4
7)

0.
15
(0
.3
0)
0.
29
(0
.4
9)
P
re
se
n
ce
of
a
le
ad
er
e
0.
24
(0
.1
7)
1.
69
**
(0
.5
1)
0.
35
(0
.7
2)
3.
49
*
(1
.8
0)
0.
17
(0
.6
9)
2.
54
(1
.8
4)
A
ve
ra
ge
ex
te
rn
al
lo
cu
s
of
co
n
tr
ol

lo
cu
s-
of
-c
on
tr
ol
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
0.
13
**
(0
.0
3)
0.
31
*
(0
.1
5)
0.
25
(0
.1
5)
A
ve
ra
ge
ex
te
rn
al
lo
cu
s
of
co
n
tr
ol

p
re
se
n
ce
of
a
le
ad
er
0.
34
**
(0
.1
2)
0.
89
*
(0
.4
2)
0.
66
(0
.4
4)
L
oc
u
s-
of
-c
on
tr
ol
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty

p
re
se
n
ce
of
a
le
ad
er

0.
49
**
(0
.1
4)

1.
07
*
(0
.5
4)

0.
78
(0
.5
7)
N
u
m
be
r
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
it
em
s t
0.
21
**
(0
.0
7)
0.
12
(0
.0
7)
M
od
el
W
al
d
ch
i-
sq
u
ar
e
29
4.
19
**
43
4.
21
**
19
0.
53
**
26
3.
72
**
23
2.
74
**
26
8.
89
**
a
T
h
e
m
et
h
od
of
ge
n
er
al
iz
ed
es
ti
m
at
in
g
eq
u
at
io
n
s
(G
E
E
)
w
as
u
se
d
to
es
ti
m
at
e
th
e
p
ar
am
et
er
s
of
th
e
m
od
el
s.
F
ir
st
-o
rd
er
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
ov
er
ti
m
e
w
as
as
su
m
ed
w
it
h
in
te
am
s.
M
od
el
s
1
an
d
2
re
p
or
t
n
eg
at
iv
e
bi
n
om
ia
l
re
gr
es
si
on
es
ti
m
at
es
.
b
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
(b
as
ed
on
th
e
H
u
be
r-
W
h
it
e
sa
n
d
w
ic
h
es
ti
m
at
or
of
va
ri
an
ce
to
ta
ke
in
to
ac
co
u
n
t
th
at
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
w
it
h
in
th
e
te
am
s
ca
n
n
ot
be
as
su
m
ed
to
be
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t)
.
c
F
or
ty
-f
ou
r
te
am
s
p
la
ye
d
si
x
p
er
io
d
s
(n

26
4)
.H
ow
ev
er
,a
s
w
e
h
ad
to
la
g
th
e
n
u
m
be
r
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
it
em
s
bo
u
gh
tb
y
th
e
te
am
s
to
as
se
ss
th
e
ca
u
sa
li
m
p
ac
to
fi
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
se
ar
ch
on
R
O
E
,
44
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
w
er
e
lo
st
,
le
av
in
g
u
s
w
it
h
22
0
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
(p
er
io
d
s
1–
5

44
te
am
s
fo
r
n
u
m
be
r
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
it
em
s
bo
u
gh
t,
an
d
p
er
io
d
2–
6

44
te
am
s
fo
r
R
O
I)
.
d
C
en
te
re
d
e
C
od
ed
0/
1.
*p

.0
5
**
p

.0
1
O
n
e-
si
d
ed
te
st
s.
we would have concluded that team composition
in terms of locus of control does not matter with
respect to information acquisition behavior and
team financial performance. However, the other
models show that this conclusion is very prema-
ture, as each and every interaction effect appears to
be significant.
Hypotheses 1a–c are clearly confirmed, as the
regressions of models 2 and 4 in Table 2 show (1) a
significant, negative effect of mean external locus
of control and (2) a significant, positive effect of the
product of the mean and the standard deviation
(locus-of-control heterogeneity) on both informa-
tion acquisition and ROE. In addition, the coeffi-
cient of that product becomes insignificant when
information acquisition is added to model 4 (see
model 6), providing evidence for mediation. Note
that the coefficient of average external locus of
control estimates the impact of mean externality
when a team’s standard deviation is zero and the
team has no leader. So, internal homogeneous
teams with no leader gather more information and
therefore achieve higher financial performance.
However, this effect decreases if the standard devi-
ation increases. This follows from the positive and
significant effect of the product term of average
external locus of control and locus-of-control
heterogeneity.
To illustrate this interaction, we plotted the pre-
dicted value of ROE as a function of mean external
locus of control for different values of a team’s
standard deviation; Figure 2 shows these slopes.
The estimates of model 4 were used for this pur-
pose, and predicted values were calculated at the
means of the other independent variables. The pat-
tern for our mediating variable, information acqui-
sition, is similar, and therefore these figures are not
reported here. The same two remarks apply to Fig-
ures 3 and 4, presented below. To compare teams
with low and high locus-of-control heterogeneity,
we calculated the standard deviation of the 44
teams’ scores on locus-of-control heterogeneity.
This standard deviation equals 1.23 (see Table 1).
In Figure 2, “low” and “high” refer to values of one
standard deviation below or above the average
team’s locus-of-control heterogeneity.
Figure 2 reveals that the estimated interaction
between average external locus of control and lo-
cus-of-control heterogeneity is nonmonotonic. That
is, an increase in the within-team standard devia-
tion lowers ROE for teams with a low mean (i.e.,
internal teams). The opposite appears to be the case
for teams with a high mean (i.e., external teams).
This pattern is consistent with our argument that
adding external individuals to internal teams,
which ceteris paribus increases the teams’ standard
deviation, reduces their information-processing ca-
pacity and therefore also their financial perfor-
mance. Conversely, it follows that adding internal
individuals to external teams increases the teams’
information-processing capacity and effectiveness.
Models 2 and 4 show that having a leader is
positively related to information acquisition behav-
ior and ROE (the coefficient of the variable pres-
ence of a leader is significant and positive). Note
that this coefficient is the estimate of the effect of
having a leader for teams with an average mean
locus-of-control score (as average external locus of
control is centered around the sample’s average),
and for teams with zero locus-of-control heteroge-
FIGURE 2
Interaction of Average External Locus of Control and Locus-of-Control Heterogeneity (Hypotheses 1a–1c)
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neity. This finding is consistent with our argument
that having a leader increases the vertical informa-
tion-processing capacity of a team. Important for
Hypotheses 2a–c is the significant and positive ef-
fect of the product of average external locus of
control and leader presence, indicating that the
impact of having a leader is larger for external
teams. This is again the case for both information
acquisition and ROE. Given that the impact of the
product of average external locus of control and
leader presence disappears when information ac-
quisition is added to model 4 (see the insignificant
coefficient in model 6), we conclude that Hypoth-
eses 2a–c are also clearly confirmed.
In Figure 3, we graphically represent the impact
of average external locus of control on predicted
ROE for teams with and without leaders. This
graph shows that a team with a high average exter-
nal locus-of-control score performs better when it
has a leader, whereas the opposite is the case for an
internal team.
Hypothesis 3 was not confirmed, as the interac-
tion of locus-of-control heterogeneity and presence
of a leader is significantly related to ROE in model
4, but with a negative sign, whereas we predicted a
positive coefficient. Apparently, heterogeneous
teams do not benefit more from having a leader but,
on the contrary, benefit less. Interestingly, we also
find a similar significant, negative interaction of
locus-of-control heterogeneity and presence of a
leader in the information acquisition equation
(model 2). As speculated in the theory section,
FIGURE 3
Interaction of Average External Locus of Control and Leadership Structure (Hypotheses 2a–2c)
FIGURE 4
Interaction of Locus-of-Control Heterogeneity and Leadership Structure (Total Effect)
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heterogeneous teams seem to collect less informa-
tion when they have leaders. These teams also had
lower returns on equity (ROEs), probably as a by-
product of having less information. The latter is
suggested by the fact that the total effect on ROE of
locus-of-control heterogeneity multiplied by the
presence of a leader is significantly negative in
model 4, but becomes insignificant when informa-
tion acquisition is added (see model 6).
Figure 4 illustrates the total effect of locus-of-
control heterogeneity on ROE for teams with and
without leaders. Figure 4 shows that the interaction
between locus-of-control heterogeneity and pres-
ence of a leader is nonmonotonic. The locus-of-
control standard deviation is positively related to
ROE for leaderless teams. However, the opposite is
the case for teams with leaders, which is difficult to
explain. The same pattern can be observed for in-
formation acquisition. Apparently, heterogeneous
teams do not need, or at least collect less, informa-
tion than homogeneous teams when they do have
leaders. Having a leader only stimulates informa-
tion gathering in homogeneous teams, perhaps be-
cause structuring information processing is more
difficult in heterogeneous than in homogeneous
teams.
We reestimated the models in Table 2 for the 25
teams that reported having leaders in order to test
whether the locus of control of a leader matters in
determining information acquisition and ROE (cf.
Hypothesis 4). Obviously, models 1 and 4 of Table
3 confirm the findings presented above, indicating
that in teams with leaders, average team externality
is positively associated with information acquisi-
tion and ROE, and locus-of-control heterogeneity is
negatively associated with those variables (see Fig-
ures 3 and 4).
Note that leader locus of control is not associated
with either outcome variable (models 2 and 5 in
Table 3), and that it does not moderate the impact
of average external locus of control and locus-of-
control heterogeneity, as both interaction terms are
insignificant. As a result, Hypothesis 4 should be
rejected. We suspect that this is because the emer-
gent leaders in the present study were more inter-
nal than the average team member (see Methods),
restricting the range of locus of control among the
team leaders. This range restriction made it more
difficult to detect any effect.
DISCUSSION AND APPRAISAL
Our empirical results clearly confirm the neces-
sity to go beyond simple main effects of team com-
position variables. In fact, analyzing main effects
only would have led us to conclude that team com-
position does not matter. Including the basic mod-
erator variables, however, significantly and consis-
tently increased the explanatory power of our
models. The findings underscore the importance of
carefully considering the aggregation rules one uses
to derive team composition variables (Chan, 1998).
Specifically, when theories describing behavior at
the individual level are invoked to predict out-
comes at the team level, one needs to recognize that
the mean of a certain characteristic is not adequate
to predict team behavior, since the impact of the
mean will depend on the diversity of that charac-
teristic within the team (and vice versa, as interac-
tions are symmetric). Additionally, the findings
confirm that the impact of the team composition
variables delicately depends on leadership struc-
ture. Taking these findings together, we conclude
that many team composition data are probably un-
deranalyzed. It is not unlikely that many nonsignif-
icant findings in previous research are due to the
omission of important moderators. In addition,
“hidden” moderators might also account for the
many inconsistencies found in prior work. This
likelihood is nicely illustrated by our finding that
diversity in locus of control increases information
acquisition behavior and team financial perfor-
mance for leaderless teams but decreases both out-
come variables when teams have leaders.
Additionally, our main findings contribute to lo-
cus-of-control research (in a team context) in two
ways. First, the well-documented fact that internal
individuals are better at information processing
than external individuals appears to be true at the
group level of analysis as well. Specifically, adding
internals to a team (without increasing the standard
deviation) is likely to increase the team’s informa-
tion-processing capacity, resulting in more infor-
mation acquisition behavior and, as a result, better
team performance. Second, the findings show that
a leader might serve as a substitute for the relatively
low information-processing capacity of an external
team. External teams clearly gain effectiveness
from having leaders. These findings have interest-
ing implications for managerial practice because
they suggest the importance of fitting group pro-
cesses and structures with the personality distribu-
tion within a team.
Bearing out traditional contingency theory, there
does not seem to be a best way to structure a team.
With respect to locus of control, it is important to
create within-group settings that naturally fit
with the needs and capacities associated with the
deep-level characteristics of team members. When
members have an internal locus of control, self-or-
ganization is likely to lead to superior team perfor-
mance. If, however, most members have an external
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locus of control, appointing a leader to guide team
members seems to be very important. Thus, an
important road to improved team effectiveness
might be the design of what could be called “natu-
ral” team configurations—natural in the sense that
externals actually like to work in structured situa-
tions with leadership, while internals prefer uncer-
tainty and individual agency. Building such con-
figurations may lead to the achievement of a
remarkable equilibrium outcome in which team ef-
fectiveness, member well-being and member satis-
faction overlap. Managers have more freedom to
enhance team effectiveness than originally thought.
The difficult task of composing optimal teams by
the careful selection of members with specific char-
acteristics can be circumvented by designing team
structures that fit a given team composition. In
more general terms, these findings suggest how
team composition can be balanced with team struc-
ture to increase team potency, a major determinant
of team effectiveness (Shea & Guzzo, 1987).
With respect to locus-of-control diversity, our
findings appear to be more difficult to interpret.
First, teams that were heterogeneous as to mem-
bers’ locus of control did not perform better when
they had leaders in the present setting, contrary to
our prediction. This finding is at odds with Hen-
driks’s (2004) findings in a field setting, showing
that organizations perform better when deep locus-
of-control “differentiation” is “integrated” with
centralized decision making. A possible explana-
tion follows from Harrison and his coauthors
(1998), who showed that it takes time for group
members to discover deep-level characteristics. It
may be that people in the simulation used for this
study did not spend enough time together to get to
know each other sufficiently well for harmful in-
terpersonal conflicts to be unleashed. In addition,
the real-world top management teams in the Hen-
driks (2004) study were not only responsible for
formulating strategies, but also for implementing
them. In the simulation, the only task of the team
members was to formulate strategic and operational
decisions, while field implementation was not an
issue. Perhaps deep-level differences need leader-
ship especially when people have to work together
to make strategies work on an ongoing, day-to-day
basis.
Notwithstanding these observations, locus-of-
control diversity did appear to be related to infor-
mation acquisition, but only for teams without
leaders. Given the absence of any related evidence
in prior research to support this finding, we can
only speculate about the underlying reason. We
suggest that heterogeneous teams collect more in-
formation for the simple reason that they need
more information in order to reconcile the different
perceptions and attitudes that result from deep dif-
ferences (irrespective of whether interpersonal con-
flict occurs or not). This need, however, is reduced
when a team has a leader because then the leader
can serve as a substitute for extensive information
gathering to achieve team integration. Paradoxi-
cally, at least in the present decision-making con-
text, heterogeneous teams with leaders ended up
with less information, and therefore appeared to be
less effective. These speculations at least under-
score Eisenhardt and colleagues’ (1997) observa-
tion that information is extremely important in
helping teams to focus on facts and not on person-
alities. Those authors also made it clear that to
understand the subtle impact of different types of
diversity in different settings, both more theoretical
work and more in-depth empirical observational
team studies (cf. Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Hambrick,
1995) are required.
We want to point to a few additional interesting
avenues for further research. First, our findings in-
dicate that Priem and colleagues’ (1999) call to
avoid sacrificing construct validity for reliable
measurement of demographic characteristics is jus-
tified. Future research should therefore focus on
other substantive personality characteristics and
underlying values of team members in order to
increase the explanatory power of team composi-
tion models. Many deep-level characteristics have
not yet been studied in a team context, such as
sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1979), self-monitor-
ing (Snyder, 1974), and value orientation (Schwartz
& Bilsky, 1990). Teams that are differently com-
posed in terms of these fundamental characteristics
are likely to produce different outcomes. The out-
comes under study should be carefully selected
and adapted to the chosen characteristics in a
meaningful way. As Priem and colleagues (1999)
put it, a focus on substantive dimensions requires
adaptations in theory prescription. Team processes
are far too complex to allow researchers to build
general theories with respect to the impact of team
composition variables.
Second, when past researchers have incorpo-
rated moderator variables in their designs, they
have mainly focused on external contingencies. For
instance, studies have tested whether or not the
benefits of team diversity are larger in dynamic
than in stable industries (Bantel & Jackson, 1989;
Halebian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick, Cho, &
Chen, 1996). Surprisingly enough, the number of
studies focusing on internal (to a team) contingen-
cies, as does the present study, is extremely lim-
ited. Our findings illustrate the saliency of these
types of moderators. Many other important basic
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internal contingencies that directly impinge on the
needed distribution of attitudes, skills, and knowl-
edge in a team deserve more attention: these in-
clude the characteristics of the team’s task (Jehn et
al., 1999), the distribution of power within the team
(Priem et al., 1999), and the intrateam division of
labor. For example, we expect that an organization
with a functional type of departmentalization
would benefit greatly from being managed by a top
management team with high functional back-
grounddiversity. However, amultidivisional organ-
ization may benefit from having many general man-
agers, each responsible for a business unit, in its
top management team, implying low functional
background diversity. Team composition research
can progress by adopting such an approach, in that
its value for managerial practice, which is now
considered to be low (Priem et al., 1999), would
clearly increase, because variables such as team
structure and division of labor are amenable to
managerial design. Systematic studies of this kind
would help managers build sustainable team con-
figurations for effective performance.
To conclude, we would like to end the article by
mentioning two limitations of our study. First, re-
search that straddles levels of analysis faces the
difficult task of explicating the theoretical underly-
ing mechanisms that link individual behavior with
group-level aggregated outcomes (Chan, 1998). In
the present case, we tried to build an argument on
how locus-of-control personality, via individual at-
titudes and behavior, affects team-level informa-
tion acquisition and effectiveness. In explicating
these links, we also invoked other important un-
derlying mechanisms such as group-level feelings
of potency and information-processing capacity,
both assumed to be influenced by team locus-of-
control composition. A full-blown empirical study
would try to measure as many putative mediating
mechanisms as possible. Taking a parsimonious
first step, however, we decided to only measure
straightforward “objective” team outcomes. To in-
crease understanding, future research might do
well to also incorporate team members’ subjective
ratings of, for instance, a team’s ability to ade-
quately deal with and integrate information, and
the degree of the team’s potency.
Second, we acknowledge that our conclusions
are based on data obtained from a business simu-
lation game, which inevitably reduces the external
validity of our findings. We nevertheless opted for
this approach as a first step for pragmatic reasons.
First, personality data on entire teams are difficult
to collect in a field setting, especially in the realm
of (top) management teams. This is probably why
so few studies in this area focus on deep-level
characteristics. Second, the simulation environ-
ment allowed us to carefully connect information
acquisition behavior to actual team effectiveness
outcomes, which is in all likelihood undoable in a
field setting. We believe, however, that the advan-
tages of having team personality data and detailed
objective information on actual team behavior and
performance outweigh the disadvantage of reduced
external validity. In this respect, we agree with
Plott’s (1988) observation that an experiment (in
the present case, a simulation) is always a fair test
of a theory because if it is correct, it should hold in
a laboratory setting. Conversely, if a theory is falsi-
fied in relatively controlled settings, there is surely
something wrong with the theory.
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